The EDR agent was missing. The SOC wasn't.
A client endpoint dropped off coverage and attackers found it before anyone did. Here’s the seven days it took Cyflare’s SOC to catch it, contain it, and close it out anyway.
900+
7 days
30+
8.3 min
One endpoint nobody was watching
In December 2024, Cyflare’s SentinelOne-powered detection flagged lateral movement using privileged credentials at 4:11 a.m. That part worked as it should. What didn’t: the systems the attacker moved into weren’t running an EDR agent at all- unmanaged and invisible to the platform.
When automation stalls, a human picks it up
Automated escalation didn’t fire twice. That’s not buried in the fine print; it’s why a staffed SOC exists. Both times, an analyst pushed the escalation forward by hand instead of waiting for the system to do it.
Confirmed, contained, and closed
The client confirmed the Fog ransomware infection the same day isolation began. Full containment took coordination on their side too, forensics, insurance, and a full server reinstall, not just a Cyflare fix. Systems were reinstalled and remediation verified within seven days of the first alert.

Coverage gaps aren't rare. Catching them is the job.
Every MSP has an asset like this one somewhere: onboarded late, migrated off a retired tool, never quite added to the rollout. Cyflare’s TechOps team checks that the agent is actually deployed and reporting, across every client, so a gap gets caught during a coverage review instead of during an incident.
"An agent gap and an automation miss happened in the same incident. Neither one turned into a missed breach, because the response didn't depend on either one working perfectly."
The layers beneath this reponse
Managed Detection and Response
Managed EDR
SOC as a Service
Managed XDR
COMMON QUESTIONS
What partners ask about incidents like this one
How do you catch an endpoint that doesn’t have an EDR agent on it?
You don’t catch it through the agent. You catch it through what the agent-covered systems around it see, in this case, lateral movement from a privileged account into unmanaged machines. It’s why SOC-level correlation matters as much as the endpoint tool itself.
What happens when your automated escalation doesn’t fire?
Do you handle the client-side coordination, or just the detection?
What’s the difference between mEDR Connect and mEDR Complete for a case like this?
Could a gap like this happen in my clients’ environments?
DON'T FIND OUT FROM A RANSOM NOTE
Find your coverage gaps before an attacker does
This client’s gap got caught because a SOC was watching everything around it, not just the endpoint itself. Worth a conversation before it’s an incident.
